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STATUTORY CHANGES IN THE LAW OF RESCISSION
IN CALIFORNIA
Prior to 1961, sections 1689 to 1691 of the California Civil Code
provided for the rescission of a contract by the mutual consent of
the parties or by a unilateral act of the party seeking the rescission.
An action brought under these provisions was usually referred to
as "rescission in pais" or an action to enforce a prior rescission.
Former sections 3406 to 3408 of the Civil Code' provided for the
adjudication by the court of the rescission of a contract. This type of
rescission is usually referred to as an action for rescission. The action
for rescission was deemed primarily one in equity,2 while the action
to enforce a prior rescission was an action at law based on the rights

arising from a prior out-of-court rescission. 3
The dual system of rescission gave rise to considerable confusion
since 4the courts had difficulty in distinguishing the two types of actions.
There were both substantive and procedural differences between the two types of actions, and the rescinding party could seriously affect the rights of the defendant by the way he phrased the
complaint. 5 The most important of these rights was, and still is,
the right to a jury trial. Since a jury trial can only be demanded as
a matter of right in an action at law, the defendant could have been
precluded from a jury trial if the complaint stated an action in
equity for rescission. 6 The type of action could also determine such7
matters as the availability of the provisional remedy of attachment
and the jurisdiction of the trial court.8 Because of the difficulty of

I Enacted 1872, repealed 1961.
2 Fairbairn v. Eaton, 6 Cal. App. 2d 264, 43 P.2d 1113 (1935); Whittaker
v. E.E. McCalla Co., 127 Cal. App. 583, 16 P.2d 282 (1932); Ingalls v. Superior
Court, 121 Cal. App. 453, 9 P.2d 266 (1932).
3 Philpott v. Superior Court, I Cal. 2d 512, 36 P.2d 635 (1934); Leland
v. Craddock, 83 Cal. App. 2d 84, 187 P.2d 803 (1947); Jensen v. Harry H. Culver
Co., 127 Cal. App. Supp. 783, 15 P.2d 907 (1932); Maxwell v. Jimeno, 89 Cal.
App. 612, 265 P. 885 (1928).
4 Comment, Failure to Distinguish Between Actions at Law Based on
PriorRescissions and Suits in Equity to Rescind, 21 CAIAF. L. REV. 130 (1933).
5 3 CAL. LAW REVISION COMM'N, REPORTS, RECOMVIENDATIONS, & STUDIES

D-6 (1961) [hereinafter cited as CAL. L. REVISI N COm'N].
6 Davis v. Security-First Nat'1 Bank, 1 Cal. 2d 541, 36 P.2d 649 (1934);
Paularena v. Superior Court, 231 Cal. App. 2d 906, 42 Cal. Rptr. 366 (1965);
Bank of Am. v. Greenbach, 98 Cal. App. 2d 220, 219 P.2d 814 (1950).
7 The availability of attachment has been granted in actions to enforce
a prior rescission because of the quasi-contractual nature of the action, but
it has been denied in actions for rescission. McCall v. Superior Court, 1 Cal.
2d 527, 534, 36 P.2d 642, 645-46 (1934).
8 3 CAL. L. REVIsION Com'eN D-28: "The superior court has exclusive
jurisdiction of all actions respecting rescission where the amount in controversy exceeds $3,000. Municipal courts have jurisdiction over all rescission
actions involving an amount in controversy not in excess of $3,000. Justice
courts have jurisdiction concurrent with the municipal courts over all actions
to enforce a rescission, other than those involving title to real property, where
the amount in controversy does not exceed $500 ....
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the courts in distinguishing the two types of actions, the California
Legislature amended the procedures for the rescission of contracts
in 1961.9 This note will explore these changes as they affect: (1)
whether the action remaining is in law or in equity, (2) the requirement of a prior offer to restore the benefits received, and (3) the
election of remedies doctrine as it applies to rescission.
1961 Changes in the California Codes
The 1961 amendments to the California Civil Code and Code of
Civil Procedure followed the recommendations of the California Law
Revision Commission.' 0 The legislature repealed sections 3406 to 3408
of the Civil Code leaving a single statutory type of rescission."
Section 1689 of the Civil Code retains all its prior grounds for rescission, and was amended 2 to include two additional grounds under subdivisions 5 and 6. These subdivisions provide that a party to a contract may rescind:
(5) If the contract is unlawful for causes which do not appear in
its terms or conditions, and the parties are not equally at fault.
(6) If the public interest will be prejudiced by permitting the contract to stand.
These grounds for rescission were previously available only under
the repealed section 3406.18
Section 1691, as amended, provides for a single notice and offer to
restore procedure, and also provides that service of pleading can be
substituted for notice or an offer to restore the benefits received.1 4
Section 1692 was added 15 and provides that if
the court determines that the contract has not been rescinded, the
court may grant any party to the action any other relief to which
he may be entitled under the circumstances.
Section 1692 also states that "[a] claim for damages is not inconsistent with a claim for relief based upon rescission."1 6 Section 1693
was added to provide that relief based on rescission shall not be
denied because of a delay in giving notice of the rescission or an offer
to restore the benefits received unless the other party has been substantially damaged by the delay. Section 1693 also permits the courts
to render conditional judgments when it states, "but the
17 court may
make a tender of restoration a condition of its judgment."'
There were also several changes in the Code of Civil Procedure.
The statute of limitations was set at 4 years for rescission of contracts in writing 8 and 2 years for oral contracts. 9 The statute of
is cognizable in both the municipal courts and the justice courts or, alternatively, only in the municipal courts, will depend upon whether the action is
in form one to enforce a recission or one to obtain rescission."
9 3 CAL.L. REvisioN Co1'nm'N D-6.
10 1961 JounNAL OF THE AssEmBLY 286.
" Cal. Stats. 1961, ch. 589, § 5, at 1735.
12 Cal. Stats. 1961, ch. 589, § 1, at 1734.
18 Cal. Stats. 1953, ch. 588, § 1, at 1835.
14 See text accompanying notes 65-75 infra.
15 Cal. Stats. 1961, ch. 589, § 3, at 1734.
16 See text accompanying notes 77-92 infra.
17 See text accompanying notes 74-76 infra.
18 CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 337.
'9 CAL. CODE CIV. PRoc. § 339.
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limitations begins to run in both statutes from the date the rescinding
party gained his right to rescind. The Code of Civil Procedure was
also amended to provide that an action brought pursuant to section
1692 of the Civil Code shall be deemed to be an action
upon an im21
plied contract for j oinder 20 and attachment purposes.
Paularenav. Superior Court2 2 is the major case construing these
changes. Suit was brought by the purchasers of homes under land
sale contracts. The action was based on a prior bona fide contract of
rescission, and included an offer to restore the benefits received under
the contract. While in possession of the property the plaintiffs made
improvements on the property, and they asked for the value of the
benefits conferred upon the defendant. The court concluded that the
action was one at law and that a jury trial was required, 23 however
the reasoning seems unclear. Quoting from the California Law Revision Commission report, the court stated that "the right of the parties to a jury and the court in which the action must be brought will
be determined by the nature of the substantive relief requested and
not by the form of the complaint." 24 The court construed "nature of
the substantive relief requested" to mean whether the "gist of the
action" would be determinable in an action at law or one in equity. 5
Since the action was basically one for a money judgment the court
26
concluded that it was an action at law.

Although this determination

was correct, the court implied that there still might be an action in
equity for rescission. In order to determine whether an action in
equity still exists it is necessary to analyze the historical basis of
jurisdiction in rescission, the nature of the cause of action, and the
specific amendments to the California Codes.
Paularena raises two other issues relating to the 1961 amendments that will be discussed in this note. It is not clear whether
Paularenarecognizes that California has abolished the requirement of
a prior offer to restore the benefits received. The court said:
The bringing of this action, as well as the allegations contained
therein, constituted compliance with the requirements that the party
rescinding must give notice of rescission
and an offer to restore the
27
benefits received under the contract.
Paularenaalso recognizes the application of section 1692 to the allowance of consequential damages, and the language used would tend to
reject the section's application to the election of remedies problem. 28
Action at Law or in Equity?

HistoricalBasis of Jurisdiction
Although California has but one form of action, and only one
20 CAL. CODE CIV. PRoc.

§ 427.

21 CAL. CODE Civ. PRoc. § 537.
22
23

24

infra.

25

26
27
28

infra.

231 Cal. App. 2d 906, 42 Cal. Rptr. 366 (1965).
Id. at 914, 42 Cal. Rptr. at 371.
Id. at 913, 42 Cal. Rptr. at 370. See text accompanying notes 49-60
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

913, 42
914, 42
913, 42
915-16,

Cal. Rptr. at 371.
Cal. Aptr. at 371.
Cal. Rptr. at 370.
42 Cal. Rptr. at 372. See text accompanying notes 77-92
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forum, the distinctions between actions at law and actions in equity
still remain. 29 The determination whether a particular action is one
at law or in equity depends upon the common law as it existed at
the time of its adoption in California, and the subsequent modifications which have taken place under California law.30
Equity rendered decrees of rescission prior to the law courts'
Equity jurisdiction in matters of fraud can be traced back to the
very existence of the court of chancery. 31 This jurisdiction was recognized as early as the reign of Henry VI, when chancery afforded a
remedy for the recovery of land alleged to have been obtained by
means of a forged deed.32 But the early law courts of England did
not recognize that fraud and misrepresentation could affect the validity of a contract, and it was only by bringing an action of deceit on
the case that fraud could be remedied. 33 Hence equity jurisdiction in
rescission cases initially arose because of the inadequacy of the remedy at law.
The law courts never considered themselves competent to enter
decrees terminating contracts.3 4 Early in the 18th century the use of
the action of indebitatus assumpsit arose to allow the plaintiff to recover at law the consideration that had been paid under the contract,
but in the case of rescission the plaintiff had to show that the contract had already been terminated.35 The application of indebitatus assumpsit resulted in a curious situation where the payment of
money was made pursuant to a contract but the repayment could
not rest on the contract because it had ceased to exist. 6 Repayment
obligation which arose from the prior
rested on the quasi-contractural
3
out-of-court rescission.
When the law courts granted restitutionary relief, their jurisdiction in rescission cases became concurrent with that of the courts
of equity.38 Although it is generally held that equity only has
jurisdiction when there is no adequate remedy at law, the subsequent granting of relief by the law courts did not oust the jurisdiction originally assumed by the courts of equity. 39 It is important
to emphasize that the distinction developed at common law between
an action in equity to rescind an existing contract and an action at
law based upon a quasi-contractual obligation resulting from a prior
termination of the contract. In 1872 California adopted the Field
Code, 40 and in the area of rescission it attempted to codify the com29 Philpott v. Superior Court, 1 Cal. 2d 512, 514, 36 P.2d 635, 636 (1934).
30 Id. at 515-16, 36 P.2d at 637.
31 3 J. POMERoY, EQurTY
32
33

JURISPRUDENCE

§ 912 (5th ed. S. Symons 1941).

5 W. HoLDswoRTr, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 293 (1927).

8 id. at 67.
34 See generally R.

JACKSON,

(1936).
35 Id. § 23.
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 See generally 1 J.
Symons 1941).
30 Id. at 276.
40 Harrison, The

REv. 185 (1922).

HISTORY OF QUAsi-CoNTRACT

POmERoY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE §

§§

18, 21-23

175 (5th ed. S.

First Half-Century of the California Code, 10 CALIF. L.
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mon law as administered in other American jurisdictions. 1
CaliforniaInterpretationPrior to 1961
Confusion developed in California both as to the requirement of
a prior offer to restore the benefits received and to the basic nature
of the action at law based on quasi-contract. The confusion was
shown in the case of Stone v. Superior Court.4 2 In that case the
plaintiff alleged both fraudulent representations and failure of consideration as grounds to enforce the prior rescission of a contract for
the sale of stock. The complaint was in two counts, one to enforce a
prior rescission and recover the consideration and the other for
money had and received. The California Supreme Court held that
the suit was basically one "sounding in fraud and deceit" and hence
equitable in nature. 43 The court in the Stone case confused the
grounds for rescission with the requested relief, which was based on
quasi-contract. By implication, the reasoning in the Stone case would
hold that an action to enforce a rescission based on fraud is equitable,
and yet retains the legal remedy for rescission based on all other
grounds.
The leading cases of Philpott v. Superior Court"4 and McCall v.
Superior Court45 seemed to clarify the distinctions between the two
types of actions. In an action to enforce a rescission based on fraud,
the court in the Philpottcase said:
It is undoubtedly true that a litigant may invoke the power of a court
of equity to effect a rescission which has not theretofore been made.
This is especially provided for by Civil Code, sections 3406-3408,
inclusive. But where the plaintiff himself has pursued the method
provided by sections 1688-1691 of the Civil Code to effect a rescission of the contract he may come into a court of law for all the relief
that court is competent to give, and in the instance where he merely
asks for a return of the consideration parted with by reason of the
fraud, mistake, failure of consideration or any other set of 4facts
authorizing rescission, he is entitled to the action of assumpsit. 6

The court clearly recognized that an action based on an out-of-court
rescission under sections 1689 to 1691 of the Civil Code was an action
at law regardless of the grounds for the rescission. The McCall
case
47
In Mcwent further and expressly overruled the Stone case.
Call the plaintiff alleged a prior rescission based on fraud and joined
that with a prayer for the ancillary equitable relief of an injunction.
The court ruled that the action was still one at law in that the plaintiff was4 entitled to attachment based on the quasi-contractual obligations. 8
41 REPORT or T=E CoMIssIoNERs or TEm CODE, CIVIL CODE OF THE STATE

OF NEW YonK (Field Code) §§ 839-41, at 257-59, §§ 1903-05, at 596-97 (1865).
42

43
44

(1935).

214 Cal. 272, 4 P.2d 777 (1931).
Id. at 275, 4 P.2d at 779.
1 Cal. 2d 512, 36 P.2d 635 (1934).

1 Cal.
Id. at
Id. at
48 Id. at
45
46
47

2d 527, 36 P.2d 642 (1934).
523, 36 P.2d at 641.
538, 36 P.2d at 647.
538-39, 36 P.2d at 647-48.

See generally Annot., 95 A.L.R. 1000
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Nature of the Relief Requested
The test used in Paularena v. Superior Court attempts to distinguish between the legal and equitable remedies based on the "nature of the substantive relief requested."49 California has never recognized this distinction, but has afforded the rescinding party a complete election as to which remedy to pursue. For example, it is
clear that where the rescinding party desired only an unconditional
money judgment he could have proceeded by way of an action at law
to enforce a rescission.5
And if more complete relief were desired,
such as the restitution of a specific chattel, an accounting, or execution of particular documents to clear a cloud on the title to real
property, the rescinding party had the right to proceed by way of an
action in equity for rescission.51 In order to prove that the rescinding
party had a complete election, it is necessary to show that he could
have brought suit at law where the gist of the action was equitable
and that he could have brought suit in equity where the gist of the
action was legal.
California has permitted the rescinding party to bring an action
at law coupled with prayers for "ancillary" equitable relief. The
McCall case held that a request for the ancillary equitable remedy of
cancellation did not prevent the action from being one at law to enforce a rescission. 52 And in Bennett v. Superior Court53 the court
held that the action was still one at law "regardless of the fact
that the exercise of equitable powers of the court are also incidentally involved." 54 A request for "ancillary" equitable remedies did
not make the legal remedy unavailable. 55
An equitable action for rescission could probably have been
brought even though only an unconditional money judgment was
sought by the rescinding party. Although equity will generally not
assume jurisdiction if there is an adequate remedy at law, no case
was found raising this specific issue in California rescission cases.
But the cases tend to support the position that the rescinding party
could have proceeded in equity,56 and nothing in the language of
sections 3406 to 3408 of the Civil Code could have been construed to
mean that the equitable remedy was available only if the action to
enforce a rescission was inadequate.
The California courts have made no distinction between the two
49 231 Cal. App. 2d at 913, 42 Cal. Rptr. at 366. See text accompanying
notes 24-26 supra.
50 Davis v. Security First Natl Bank, 1 Cal. 2d 541, 36 P.2d 649 (1934); Ito
v. Watanabe, 213 Cal. 487, 2 P.2d 799 (1931); Miller v. Eisenberg, 90 Cal. App.

2d 479, 203 P.2d 11 (1949).

51 E.g., Lenard v. Edmonds, 151 Cal. App. 2d 764, 312 P.2d 308 (1957);
Bank of Am. v. Greenbach, 98 Cal. App. 2d 220, 219 P.2d 814 (1950).
52 1 Cal. 2d 527, 36 P.2d 642 (1934).
55 218 Cal. 153, 21 P.2d 946 (1932).
54 Id. at 161, 21 P.2d at 949.
55 Alder v. Drudis, 30 Cal. 2d 372, 182 P.2d 195 (1947); Prewitt v. Sunnymead Orchard Co., 189 Cal. 723, 209 P. 995 (1922); Leland v. Craddock, 83 Cal.
App. 2d 84, 187 P.2d 803 (1947).
56 See, e.g., Fairbairn v. Eaton, 6 Cal. App. 2d 264, 43 P.2d 1113 (1935);
Shaffer v. Security Trust & Say. Bank, 4 Cal. App. 2d 707, 41 P.2d 948 (1935).
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types of actions based on the substantive relief requested. 57 The
basic relief requested in both types of actions is the rescission of a
contract and restoration to the position held prior to the contract.
Pomeroy classifies the power of equity in rescission cases in the class
of actions
which the legal procedure recognizes, but does not directly confer,
and the beneficial results of which it obtains in an indirect manner.
Here the remedy of cancellation is not expressly asked for, nor
granted by the court of law, but all its effects are indirectly obtained
in the legal action.58
The essential criterion the California courts have used to distinguish
the two types of actions has been based on the form in which the plaintiff phrased his complaint 5 9 The court has noted that, "Such words as
'equitable relief' and 'equitable action', found in court opinions, have
only led to confusion." 60
Only the Legal Remedy Remains
The legislature by repealing the procedure of judicial rescission
under Civil Code sections 3406 to 3408 abolished the procedure that
had previously been deemed equitable in nature. The changes made
in the procedure to enforce a prior rescission do not change the essential character from being one at law based on quasi-contract. The
changes in the Code of Civil Procedure emphasize this point. Section 427 of the Code of Civil Procedure now specifies that an action
based on rescission shall be deemed an action on implied contract
for joinder purposes, and section 537 provides for attachment in actions brought under section 1692 of the Civil Code.
The goals of the California Law Revision Commission were to
eliminate the dual system of rescission and to establish a single
simplified system.61 The Commission stated that a jury trial should
be provided in all cases of rescission. 2 This is in direct conflict with
the portion of the Law Revision Commission's study which was
quoted in Paularena3 which would determine the rights of the parties
by the "nature of the substantive relief requested." It is true that
"[t] he current code sections governing an action based upon rescission
do not expressly declare whether it is in law or equity," 64 but from
an analysis of the quasi-contractual nature of the action to enforce a
rescission, the repeal of the code provisions formerly deemed equitable in nature, and the overriding intent of the Revision Commission
to establish a single simplified system, one may conclude that California has retained only the legal action to enforce a rescission.
Philpott v. Superior Court, 1 Cal. 2d 512, 36 P.2d 635 (1934).
1 J. Pomamoy, EQurTy JURiSPRUDENCE § 110 (5th ed. S. Symons 1941).
59 See generally Philpott v. Superior Court, 1 Cal. 2d 512, 36 P.2d 635
(1934).
60 Id. at 521, 36 P.2d at 640.
61 3 CAL. L. R~msIoN Commnw'N D-23.
62 Id.
63 See text accompanying note 24 supra.
64 Paularena v. Superior Court, 231 Cal. App. 2d 906, 913, 42 Cal. Rptr.
366, 370 (1965).
57

58
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Offer to Restore ihe Benefits Received
In some jurisdictions a distinction is made between the two types
of actions, based on the requirement of a prior offer to restore the
benefits received. 6 5 Actions to enforce a rescission can only be
brought if there is an offer to restore the benefits received prior to
the commencement of the action. 66 However, in actions for rescission the mere bringing of the suit is deemed to be notice of the
rescission and offer to restore. 67 But prior to the amendments
under discussion, California failed to distinguish the two types of actions on this basis and had required, with certain68exceptions, the
prior notice or offer to restore in both types of actions.
69
Although dicta in Pauarena
and the recent case of Modoc Mineral & Oil Co. v. Cal-Vada Drilling & Exploration Co.7 ° imply that
California has retained the requirement, this implication is inaccurate. Following the lead of New York, 71 Civil Code section 1691 was
amended to read:
When notice of rescission has not otherwise been given or an offer
to restore the benefits received under the contract has not otherwise
been made, the service of a pleading in an action or proceeding that
seeks relief based on rescission shall be deemed to be such notice or
offer or both.
This language seems straightforward, and the New York courts, construing a similar provision, have come to the conclusion that the
prior offer to restore is no longer required in either type of action.7,2 It was also the intent of 7the
California Law Revision Com3
mission to abolish the requirement.
Once the notice and offer to restore procedure was abolished it
became desirable to give the law court the power to grant conditional
judgments in order to protect the rights of the defendant. For example, in an action to enforce a rescission where the title to real property had been transferred, the defendant might have been required
to proceed in another action to obtain a reconveyance of the property. But if the action was for rescission in equity, the court would
have had the power to protect the defendant by making the judg-

685E.g., Annot., 95 A.L.R. 1000 (1934); 1941 N.Y. LAw RvisioN
REP RTS 283.
66 Id. at 1003.
87

Id. at 1010.

ComM'N,

Crouch v. Wilson, 183 Cal. 576, 191 P. 916 (1920); Kelley v. Owens,
120 Cal. 502, 507, 47 P. 369, 370 (1898). Although many exceptions developed
to the requirement of a prior offer to restore in actions for rescission, they
are not important in the light of the recent amendment to section 1691.
69 231 Cal. App. 2d at 913, 42 Cal. Rptr. at 370. See text accompanying
note 27 supra.
70 236 Cal. App. 2d 868, 46 Cal. Rptr. 508 (1965).
71 3 CAL. L. REVsiON CoMz'N D-34; see N.Y. Civ. PRAc. § 3004 (McKinney
1963).
72 DeLeon v. Caplan, 204 Misc. 535, 126 N.Y.S.2d 482 (1953); Gordon v.
Pushkoff, 67 N.Y.S.2d 873 (1946).
78 3 CAL. L. REVIsIoN COMMIN D-34: 't
would seem, therefore, that the
most expeditious and equitable solution to the uncertainties arising out of the
restoration requirement would be to do away with the requirement of a prejudgment offer to restore .... "
68
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ment conditional upon the plaintiff's restoring the consideration.7 4
Although conditional judgments are generally equitable devices,
the California courts have effectively granted conditional decrees in
actions to enforce a rescission by the rather dubious method of denying the defendant's motion for a new trial on the condition that the
plaintiff tender the consideration received.75 To eliminate the necessity for this procedure Civil Code section 1693 was added to provide for conditional judgments regardless of the relief requested. 76

Election of Remedies
The doctrine of election of remedies usually refers to cases where
a person has two inconsistent remedies available, and at some time
before judgment he is required to elect the one he desires to pursue.7 7 The cases of concern here result from the choice of whether
to seek damages based upon the contract or to disaffirm the contract
and seek rescission. Once the election is made the plaintiff is barred
from bringing the other action.7 8 For an election it must be shown
that the plaintiff intended to affirm the contract. 79 The doctrine
has been applied in California to cases where the plaintiff has first
elected to affirm the contract and then later decides to rescind,8 0
but it has not been applied to cases where the plaintiff first attempts
unsuccessfully to disaffirm the contract and then later seeks damages
pursuant to the contract. 8 '
Paragraph three of section 1692 states:
A claim for damages is not inconsistent with a claim for relief based
upon rescission. The aggrieved party shall be awarded complete
relief, including restitution of benefits, if any, conferred by him as
a result of the transaction and any consequential damages to which
he is entitled; but such relief shall not include duplicate or inconsistent items of recovery.
At first glance it would appear that this section is concerned with the

problem of election of remedies, but a more careful analysis indicates
that this section was intended only to allow the court to grant consequential damages in addition to restitution.
A similar statute was adopted in New York in 1941.32 The statute
was designed8 3 to overcome the hardship brought about by the
application of the election of remedies doctrine in the case of Weigel
v. Cook.8 4 In that case the defendant, by fraudulent statements, induced the plaintiff to purchase certain land. Prior to the discovery
74 Loud v. Luse, 214 Cal. 10, 3 P.2d 542 (1931); Conlin v. Studebaker Bros.,
175 Cal. 395, 165 P. 1009 (1917); see former Cal. Civ. Code § 3408, (repealed
1961).
75 E.g., Engle v. Farrell, 75 Cal. App. 2d 612, 171 P.2d 588 (1946).
76 3 CAr,. L. REVISION CoMM'N D-34.
77 Note, Election of Remedies: The California Basis, 19 HAsTINGs L.J.
1233 (1968).
78 Lenard v. Edmonds, 151 Cal. App. 2d 764, 768, 312 P.2d 308, 310 (1957).
79 Montgomery v. McLaury, 143 Cal. 83, 76 P. 964 (1904).
80 Id.

81 Lenard v. Edmonds, 151 Cal. App. 2d 764, 312 P.2d 308 (1957).
82 N.Y. Civ. PnAc. § 3002(e) (McKinney 1963).
83 1941 N.Y. LAW REVISIoN Comm'N,
REPORTS 285, 287.
84 237 N.Y. 136, 142 N.E. 444 (1923).
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of the fraud, the plaintiff expended mbney for. the improvement of
the land. In an action for rescission the. plaintiff asked. for restitution of the consideration he. had paid the defendant plus the. amount
expended on the improvements. The court held that the plaintiff was
bound to make an election. either to rescind the. contract and seek
restitution or to seek damages.8 The decision g-isapplies the doctrine of election of remedies since there is nothing inconsistent with
disaffirming the contract and also seeking damages incurred in reliance on the fraudulent representations. Consequential damages
are not based on the contract -but-are -merely designed to return the
plaintiff to the position he was in prior'to the contract. 86 ' The New
all been concerned
York cases since the adoption of the statute have
87
with the issue of allowing consequential damages.
Paulerena v. Superior Court8 8 recognized the election of remedies doctrine as it applies to rescission. The court seemed to reject
the application of section 1692 to this problem when they said:
These statutory provisions do not purport to declare that a claim for
damages based upon an affirmance of the contract is not inconsistent
with a claim for damages based upon a rescission of the contract. To
the contrary they recognize that any relief awarded "shall not include duplicate or inconsistent items of recovery," and thus eliminate an award of damages based upon inconsistent causes of action.8 9
It must be concluded that the California Law Revision Commission was concerned only with the issue of consequential damages, and
two recent cases have applied section 1692 to allow such damages.9 0
One can assume that if the Law Revision Commission was referring
to the complicated doctrine of election of remedies they would have
presented a full and detailed discussion. In the only possible reference to this provision in their study, the Commission stated that the
purpose of the legislation was " [ t] o dispel any doubt concerning the
scope of relief that may be given in an action to enforce rescission, the
statute should also indicate that the court may award consequential
damages as well as a restoration of any consideration that has
been given." 91 But it does not seem that this section of the code
was necessary since the California courts have never adopted the
New York doctrine of Weigel v. Cook. California courts had previto return him to his
ously given the plaintiff all the relief necessary
92
position prior to the formation of the contract.
Conclusion
By the 1961 amendments to the law of rescission, California has
retained only the legal remedy of rescission. Thus a jury trial can
85 Id. at 141, 142 N.E. at 446.
86 See 3 S. WnmisoN, CONTRAcTS

§§ 1478-79 (1924).

E.g., Looney v. Smith, 198 Misc. 99, 96 N.Y.S.2d 607 (1950); Victor v.
De Maziroff, 87 N.Y.S.2d 543 (1949).
88 231 Cal. App. 2d 906, 42 Cal. Rptr. 366 (1965).
89 Id. at 915-16, 42 Cal. Rptr. at 372; see Doctor v. Lackenridge Constr. Co.,
252 A.C.A. 788, 60 Cal. Rptr. 824 (1967).
90 Thorson v. Western Dev. Corp., 251 A.C.A. 210, 59 Cal. Rptr. 299 (1967);
Millar v. James, 254 A.C A 570, 62 Cal. Rptr. 335 (1967).
91 3 CAL. L. REmIoN COMM'N D-7-8.
92 Walsh v. Majors, 4 Cal. 2d 384, 49 P.2d 598 (1935); Lobdell v. Miller,
114 Cal. App. 2d 328, 250 P.2d 357 (1952).
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be demanded as a matter of right in all rescission actions. The
amendments have abolished the requirement of a prior offer to restore the benefits received, and allow the law courts the power to
grant conditional judgments in rescission cases. Section 1692 reinforces the position that the plaintiff can obtain complete relief in one
action by permitting consequential damages in addition to restitution.
Daniel Jay Isenberg*
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